The “resource curse” literature often focuses on how natural resource abundance can negatively impact economic development through its effects on institutional quality. This paper examines the original constitutions of all U.S. states to determine how the presence of known natural resources at statehood influenced constitutional length and provisions. We find that states with known resources at statehood adopted constitutions with weaker institutional structures that increase the risk of expropriation and hinder economic freedom. Specifically, these states tend to tax and regulate more broadly, transfer wealth to a greater extent, and adopt weaker property rights structures through greater regulation and broader eminent domain powers. They also adopt longer constitutions, suggesting a greater attempt to control economic activity. These findings suggest that known resource abundance at the time of constitutional design can lead to institutional structures that impede economic development. This study contributes to the resource curse literature by highlighting the importance of the timing of resource discovery relative to constitutional formation, a factor often overlooked in previous research.
